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NOTES
CONFESSION IN CRIMINAL LAW -

VOLUNTARY OR INVOLUNTARY.-

This paper is primarly concerned with the general rules followed to
determine whether a confession being used by the state in a criminal
trial is voluntary. As a general rule which we will see later is to the
effect that a confession that is not voluntary will not be admissible in
a criminal trial.
It may be well, at the outset to define the word confession so as
there will be no confusion as to its meaning. A Tennessee court defined confession as follows: "A confession is a voluntary statement made
by a person charged with the commission of a crime, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged." I Thus we
see there are three elements in a confession: First, it is a voluntary
statement; second, it is made by the person who is guilty of the crime;
and thirdly, it is an acknowledgment of guilt. This paper is concerned with the first element of the confession, that is, as to its voluntary character.
Many times confession and admissions are confused and thought
to be one and the same thing. The distinction between the two is best
stated in the words of Corpus Juris Secundum: "The difference between a confession and an admission is that the former, as has been
said, is an acknowledgment of guilt while the latter is but an acknowledgment of some circumstance in itself insufficient to constitute
guilt, and tending only toward the proof of the ultimate fact of guilt." 2
1
2

Collins v. State, 169 Tenn. 393, 88 S. W. (2d) 452 (1935).
22 C. J. S. § 816, page 1422.

NOTES
In the United States as distinguished from many countries a confession can only be used if it is voluntary. In many places this rhle
is found one of which is the "Encyclopaedia of Evidence" which states:
"One of the prime requisites of a confession competent to be proved
against the party making it is that it be voluntary and without restraint,
coercion or influence of any kind, but if so made it is competent
evidence.3
The best method for determining the courts' rulings concerning this
general rule is to look at a few cases in which the general question
has been in issue. In a 1937 Iowa case 4 the court upon the question
of voluntary confessions stated that the question was one for the jury
to decide and that it should be submitted to them, and also quoting
from the decision; "It (the confession) must not be induced by promised benefit or fear of threatened injury or by inquesitorial methods
which directly or indirectly menace the life or safety of the prisoner."
In this case the treatment complained of was an oral examination that
lasted twelve hours, through a complete night, during which the prisoner
was not allowed to sleep. As was said the question as to the confession
being voluntary was submitted to the jury. The jury found that the
confession was voluntary. Thus we see that the court let the jury
decide the question about the confession after telling the jury that
this was their duty; i.e. to decide the effect to be given to the confession.
In another case where the "water cure" was used to induce the
prisoner to sign a confession the supreme court held that this confession
so obtained would be inadmissible. 5 In connection with this same question a New York court held that where defendant offered to prove the
confession was obtained by beating and mistreatment of said defendant,
and the trial court refused to admit this offered testimony, the trial
judge had committed error as this testimony was vital in determining
the voluntary character of the confession. 6
Thus it can be said, with authority, that confessions obtained by
injuring the prisoner physically in order to induce him to confess will
be inadmissible in the trial of the prisoner for the crime to which he
so confessed.
In an Alabama case where the defendant was transported from one
jail to "another, put on a bread and water diet at times and finally after
all this a confession was obtained, held that this confession was not
admissible because it was clearily involuntary. 7 Thus we see that
3 The Encyclopaedia of Evidence by Camp and Crowe, Vol. 3, page 301.
4 State v. Hienz, 223 Iowa 1241, 275 N. W. 10 (1937).
5 Joslin v. State, 129 Miss. 181, 91 So. 903 (1922).
6 People v. Alex, 260 N. Y. 425, 183 N. E. 906 (1933).
7 Palmore v. State, 244 Ala. 227, 12 So. (2d) 854 (1943).
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physical injury need not be present in order to make a confession involuntary; in other words a confession may be held involuntary even
though not obtained through the use of beating and that sort of procedure. Coercion alone, at times, is enough to render a confession involuntary.
In a 1942 Mississippi case where the defendant, after being questioned
several times in the course of a few days concerning the murder of his
wife, finally confessed and this confession was admitted upon the trial
and defendant objected to the admission. From a conviction the defendant appealed assigning as error the admission of this confession,
because he alleged that it was obtained forceably and that it was involuntary. The supreme court in affirming the decision of the trial
court said, "The confession in the instant case is found to have been
properly submitted to the jury, and, being consistent with all the
physical facts and circumstances, is found worthy of acceptance by the
trial jury. 8 Here the court held that where the questioning was of a
reasonable character, and no promises or threats were made to the
prisoner to induce said confession, to allow said confession to be used
at the trial was not error.
In a Nevada case we see that a promise to release the prisoner is
enough to make the confession involuntary if the confession is made
because of said promise. In the Nevada case the trial court was upheld by the supreme court when it, the trial court, refused to admit
a confession made because of a promise such as the one above stated. 9
From this case it can be said that a confession obtained on a promise
of lenience is inadmissible at the trial of the prisoner because such a
confession is held by the courts to be involuntary.
Many times the objection to the admission of a confession has been
based upon the fact that the arresting officers and the questioning officers did not warn the prisoner that anything that he might say in
their presence could and would be used against him in any trial for
the crime with which he is charged. To answer this objection a New
Mexico court said; "It is not necessary that warning be given the accused, when under arrest, that his extra judicial confession may be
used against him, in order to render the same admissible." 10 From
this came the rule that any voluntary statement made before arresting
officers can be used against the party making said statement even
though the prisoner did not know of this fact.
Again the point of physical injury was raised in a Missouri case.
Here the defendant was subjected to 18 hours of continuous questioning; stripped and forced to look into two bright lights while being
Cooper v. State, 11 So. (2d) 207, 194 Miss. 592 (1942).
9 State v. Gee Jon, 46 Nevada 418, 211 P. 676 (1933).
10 State v. Archuleta, 29 N. Mex. 25, 217 P. 619 (1923).
8

NOTES
questioned. The supreme court held that this confession was not
voluntary and because of this not admissible. The conviction was
reversed and a new trial was granted."
From the preceeding cases it is seen that a confession is held to be
involuntary if the prisoner or accused is physically beaten or abused,
or if he is coerced by promises of leniency or freedom. We also see
where a confession is obtained by the use of fear it will not be admitted,
and that if a prisoner attempts to prove his confession was involuntary
such proof must be heard for at least what it is worth.
The final question to be noted here is: Who must decide the question as to whether the confession is voluntary - court or jury?
There are two general rules, as might be expected, that are followed
by the states. The first is that the duty to decide this question is upon
the court.
Alabama is the leading state taking this view and in an 1894 case
the supreme court in passing on the question said; "It is the court's
duty to determine the admissibility of confessions, - whether they are
voluntary or not, - and it is the jury's province and duty to weigh
and consider them." 12 The court went on to say in effect that a confession is merely evidence upon which the court has to pass as to admitting and that the jury could judge said confession after its admission in any light they wished to just as they do any other piece of
evidence.
The second theory is that the jury must pass upon the voluntary
character of the confession and was settled for Arkansas by the supreme
court in the following words; "We are of the opinion that appellant
was . . . entitled to an instruction submitting to the jury the question
whether or not the confession was freely and voluntarily given without
coercion or promises of leniency." Is This rule seems to be based upon
the theory that the jury can in considering the evidence place any
weight upon it they feel it deserves and if they feel the confession was
not voluntary they will disregard it not withstanding the fact the court
admitted it so there is little use in having the court pass upon the
question of it being voluntary or not as the jury takes this into consideration anyway.
L. E. Merman.

11 State v. Ellis, 294 Mo. 269, 242 S. W. 952 (1922).
12 Stone v. State, 105 Ala. 60, 17 So. 114 (1894).
Is Henery v. State, 151 Ark. 620, 237 S. W. 454 (1922).
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EQUITY.-May a Taxpayer Enjoin the Collection of an Unlawful Tax in Illinois?-The question confronting us in this particular
instance is whether a single taxpayer may enjoin the collection
or exaction of an unlawful tax, and so we must clarify first the question whether a taxpayer has a sufficient interest to test the validity of
tax legislation either at law. or in equity. First of all it has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that neither a State
or a taxpayer has a sufficient interest to contest the validity of Federal
expenditures,' yet one must distinguish between the right to test the
validity of the tax itself, and the right to test the validity of the expenditures for which the tax funds are used. However, by congressional
legislation in 1867, a bill was enacted reading that:
"No suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection
of any tax shall be maintained in any court." 2
Nevertheless there has been a growing tendency of late to use the injunction to contest the validity of a tax, especially so in State courts
with respect to the contest of the validity of State laws. A New Mexico
court, for example, as early as 1926, denied the right of a taxpayer in
such an action, but said "there is an apparently increasing tendency
to admit the right." 3 The arrival and recognition of declaratory judgments in procedure has added another means of presenting a constitutional issue of this sort, for in this manner the party need not await
a law suit, thus allowing penalties to accumulate in the meantime. The
original solution to this problem followed this pattern, whereby the
taxpayer did not pay the tax, thus forcing the Federal Government to
sue, and then alleged the unconstitutionality of the tax Act as a defense. In the meantime penalties accrued. Under modern law however, it appears that if the party who invokes the aid of the court in
an action at law can prove the statute is invalid, and as a result that
he is in immediate danger of some direct injury as the result of its
enforcement, the court will entertain the action.
This problem has been handled in various ways, namely by Declaratory Judgments, by forcing the taxing body to sue the taxpayer thereby testing the validity of the tax as a defense, and by the joinder of
several taxpayers in order to enjoin the assessment of an illegal tax
on the theory that a multiplicity of suits will render equitable intervention proper thereby persuading the court of equity to overlook the
fact that there exists an adequate remedy at law to pay the tax and
4
sue for a refund.
1 Mass. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 67 N. E. 1078 (1923).
2 26U. S.C.A.§ 154.
Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. M. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926).
4 Sherman v. Benford, 10 R. I. 559, 26 R. C. L. § 416 (1873).
s

NOTES
Therefore by the great weight of authority several taxpayers affected
in a similiar manner by an illegal tax or license fee may join in a
proceeding in equity to restrain the enforcement of the tax. 5
As to whether Illinois courts of Equity will enjoin the exaction of an
unlawful tax, there is a diversity of opinion which seems to have
changed with the years and the progress of taxation. An action by a
single taxpayer, it is true, eliminates in many instances the possibility
of a multiplicity of suits, thereby necessitating other grounds for equitable intervention. Therefore in a period from 1898 to 1914 Illinois
courts held that (a) the collection of an excessive tax will not be enjoined because the complainant's legal remedy for correction does not
stay the proceedings, and collection might be attempted before determination of the controversy, 6 and (b) that because a board of review
failed to afford the taxpayer the opportunity to show that his property
had been overvalued by the assessor, was not a ground for enjoining
the collection of said tax, due to the fact that the taxpayer had an
adequate legal remedy in a writ of mandamus, 7 and (c) the rule that
the existence of an adequate remedy at law is a sufficient objection to
the jurisdiction of a court
of equity was applicable to a bill to enjoin
8
the collection of a tax.
Yet in direct opposition to these theories, it was also decided that
courts of equity have jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of taxes assessed on exempt property, even though the owner made no effort or
endeavor to avoid the tax either before municipal authorities or in the
County Court on an application for judgment for delinquent taxes, 9
and this early decision was again reaffirmed in 1911 when an Illinois
court held that equity could and would enjoin the collection of a tax
on property exempt from taxation. 10 The distinguishing feature in
this type of action is that while no single taxpayer has a sufficient interest to contest the validity of a Congressional Act merely for the
purpose of avoiding the tax, they, nevertheless, have the right to enjoin
the collection of a tax if by the Congressional Act they were not intended to pay taxes under the Act. Hence in such an action they are
not denying the validity of the Act, but only denying that it applies to
them, and as a result are enjoining the collection of an unauthorized
tax. The general rule that courts of equity will not take jurisdiction
to grant relief if redress for the wrong may be had in a proceeding at
5 Drainage Commrs. v. Kinney, 233 Ill. 67, 84 N. E. 34 (1908); Clark
Teachers Agency v. Chicago, 220 Ill. App. 319 (1920).
6 New Haven Clock Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 Il. 383, 51 N. E. 629 (1898).
7 White v. Raymond, 188 Ill. 298, 58 N. E. 976 (1900).
8 Herschbach v. Kaskaskia Sanitary District, 265 Ill. 388, 106 N. E. 942
(1914).
9 Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Kern, 147 Ill. 483, 35 N. E. 240 (1893); Siegfried
v. Raymond, 190 Il. 424: 60 N. E. 868 (1901).
10 Moline Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Ill. 348, 96 N. E. 1044 (1911).
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law prevails in Illinois, but the instant case (relief from the collection
of unauthorized taxes) is deemed an exception and equity assumes
jurisdiction. This principle was first applied in the case of The Chicago, Baltimore & Quincy RR v. Frary 1 and later upheld in Viely v.
Thompson 12 as an exception to the general rule that equity will not
assume jurisdiction when there is an adequate remedy at law.
In 1883 the case of Searing v. Heavysides 13 followed the trend of
its predecessors and asserted that despite the fact that the remedy at
law was adequate, and the plaintiff might pay the tax and sue for a
refund, equity as an exception to the general rule, would enjoin the
collection of an unauthorized, unlawful, and improper tax which had
been assessed on property and charged to the plaintiff, though in fact
the plaintiff did not own said property. "The plaintiff was not bound
to anticipate that the assessor would assess to him, property owned by
another person. Such assessment made without the plaintiff's knowledge was void, and he is not limited to a remedy before a board of
review," but rather is entitled to an injunction to restrain the collection of said tax by the assessor.' 4 As recently as 1937 the Supreme
Court of the State of Illinois held that equity would take jurisdiction
to restrain the collection of a tax assessed against property which the
taxpayer did not own at the time of the assessment, or where the
property is assessed at an amount grossly in excess of its true value
for in either case such a levy would be without authority of law.' 5
Again in 1943 the court appeared to follow the old doctrine of stare
decisis by stating that even though a revenue statute provided means
by which the decision of the taxing body could be reviewed, it still was
only a cumulative remedy and the taxpayer could proceed in equity
unless the party accepts the remedy provided by the statute. Hence,
when remedies are provided by statute they are considered as cumulative remedies, and are exclusive only when they have first been invoked
by the taxpayer. The court again pointed out that the exception to
the general rule by which equity acquires jurisdiction applies only to
the illegal and unauthorized imposition of a tax, and not to irregularities
in levying a lawful tax. As a result of these findings the court held
that equity would enjoin the collection of a tax not authorized by law,
or levied on property exempt from taxation, even though there is an
adequate remedy at law and no special circumstances authorizing the
issuance of an injunction exist. 16
11
12

Supra, 22 IM. Rep. 34 (1859).
Supra, 44 Ill. Rep. 9 (1867).

13 Supra, 106 Ill. Rep. 85 (1883).
14 Moline Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Il. 348, 96 N. E. 1044 (1911).
15 Fekin Loan Co. v. Soltermann, 365 Ill. 460, 6 N. E. (2d) 857 (1937).
16 Owen Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibbin, Director of Finance, 385 Ill. 245,
52 N. E. (2d) 177 (1943).

NOTES
In the dictum of the recent case of Ames v. Schlager, County Collector 17 the court clarified the situation of a taxpayer seeking an injunction by pointing out that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin
a levy, extension, or collection of a tax not authorized by law, or assessed on property either exempt or not subject to the tax imposed, or
levied by persons without right or color of authority, or where fraud
intervenes in the assessment or levy, or where a tax is imposed on an
occupation not subject thereto, but that such an unauthorized and void
tax must be distinguished from an irregular or erroneous but lawful
tax which a court of equity will not enjoin. The court did appear to
reverse itself in one respect, perhaps unconsciously, when it held that
the illegality of a tax will not alone justify interposition of a court of
equity to restrain its collection, and before such relief can be granted
there must exist special circumstances which will bring the case under
some acknowledged head of equity jurisprudence.
John F. Power.
JOINT

VENTUxEs.-The law of joint ventures has yet to reach its

maturity for the association that is called the joint venture, is still
in its infancy. The joint venture was not created or recognized by the
courts until around the first of the 19th century. The first case where
the court referred to the joint venture as a separate business association was in the case of Ross v. Willett.' Ever since then the joint venture has grown although in the last 10 years it has experienced tl, !
most rapid period of its growth. The joint venture has been defined
as an association of two or more persons to carry out a single busine: .;
enterprise for profit. 2 The partnership and the joint Venture are so
close akin that many of the courts applied the partnership law to the
joint venture; however, there are a few fundamental differences in the
two associations. The outstanding difference between a partnership
and the joint venture is that the joint venture relates to a specific line
of transactions. 3 In contrast, a partnership relates to a more general
and a continuing business.4 It is also noted that the associations of a
partnership are of a more formal, while the joint venture is of a more
informal nature. Because of the aforestated reason many associations
have not desired to take upon themselves that distinction which follows
the partnership distinction. There are various other differences which
will be discussed further on in the paper.
To solve a specific problem we might assume this set of facts: A an
experienced stock market speculator at B's request agrees to invest and
17

Supra, 386 Ill. 160, 53 N. E. (2d) 937 (1944).

Ross v. Willett, 27 N. Y. S. 785 (1894).
2 Tompkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 97 F. (2d) 398 (1938).
3 Clark v. Sidway, 142 U. S. 682 (1890).
4 McSherry v. Market Corp., 129 Cal. App. 330, 18 P. (2d) 776 (1933).
1
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reinvest 10,000 dollars of B's money which B tendered to A for that
purposeand they agree to split the profits 50%y to A. and 50% to
B. In the course of the next year A pays to B 6,500 dollars and subsequently B dies and his administrator sues A for an accounting. What
was the relationship between A and B? What difference would it make
in the accounting proceeding? A careful study of the facts and the
intentions of the parties is required. B in tendering the $,1000 to A
did not stipulate that she was to retain title over the money, or dominion, over the sum tendered to A for investment; or, that the sum
tendered would be the amount of her equity in the profits. The tendering of the $1,000 to A amounted only to a contribution to the association that would be formed with A when A contributed his time and
services. It was not the intention that the principal, who was B, would
retain control over the speculator, who was A. This would take the
association that would be formed out of the class of a principal and
an agent for in an association the principal has control over the agent.
This was not the association's intention: A and B merely made contributions into the venture and did not intend for one to act as principal
and the other as agent. B tendered the sum to A to form a venture
which was the purpose of investing and reinvesting and dividing the
profits. This limited the business which the association intended to
carry on. If the intention had been to establish a speculation partnership it would have been stated in the agreement. To do this, the
parties would have had to create an association with more broad powers
for the investing and reinvesting of other persons sums tendered to it
to fall in with the above generally accepted definition of a partnership that a partnership carries on a more general business while the
joint venture carries on a more specific line of business or transactions.
All the parties intended to do was to invest the sum that B tendered
in to the association. This did not intend to carry on the general
business of speculation. Next we come to the division of the profits.
B in her agreement with A did not refer or intend for the division of
the profits to act as a compensation to A as an agent for his skill and
time rendered in the association. B agreed that the profits should be
divided equally between the parties inferring that A was to receive his
profits because of his equitable ownership in the business. From this
it can be plainly seen that A and B agreed and intended to unite their
efforts and contributions to secure profits from their venture and divide
them equally.
In summarizing the conclusion drawn from the reasoning above, let
us set out the fundamental results reached. 1. B in contributing the
sum of money to A acted as a contribution and not a tendering over
of the sum to be invested. 2. That it was the intention of the parties
to enter into a special or limited business. 3. That the share of the
profits that A was to receive was not to act as a compensation but an
equitable share in the profits as was his equitable share in the business.

NOTES
In view of these conclusions reached, the court in Lesser v. Smith
ruled that the association formed was that of a joint venture.5 In the
case, the plaintiff together with another person combined with another
person, who was a speculator who resided in another city, to invest the
funds contributed by the two parties and continue to reinvest the funds
and to divide the profits between the three parties. Of the three parties
to the association, two contributed funds to the third party who was a
speculator to invest and reinvest and divide the profits between them.
This case is identical to the set of facts given for the term paper. In
his opinion Judge Haines said "The underfeature of the relationship
of a customer and his broker is that of agency. If that were the
relation of the parties, it would be necessary to hold the plaintiff as the
principal and the defendant his agent in carrying out the purposes of
the 'pool.' The defendant would have been subject to the orders of
the plaintiff, and the latter would ordinarily have become obligated
to him for commissions for the services performed as the broker. Upon
the facts which have been outlined, such was 6bviously not the case.
The defendant was jointly interested in the undertaking, supplying the
judgment, knowledge and discretion necessary to carry on the venture,
and the other members furnished the cash as their part of their contribution to the enterprise. Under such circumstances, this was clearly
a joint adventure." This decision has been backed by many previous
decisions. The argument presented by Judge Haines in this opinion
relates directly to the problem presented for the term paper and clearly
sets out that the association formed between A and B was that of a
joint venture.
When the joint adventure is terminated by the death of a co-adventurer the co-adventurer is held to be accountable for the profits
earned prior to the death of the co-adventurer.6 The remaining coadventurer is under a duty to render the accounting of the profits to
the administrator of the deceased. The best remedy for the accounting
by the remaining member of the joint venture has been considered in
equity even though there be a right to sue in the court of law. 7 In
the joint venture of A and B, B's administrator will sue in the court
of Equity for an accounting of the profits of the dissolved joint venture
by the death of B. Therefor B's administrator will receive one-half of
the profits of the joint venture earned after the payment of the $6,500
as B's share in the last profits distributed to the time of B's death.
Arthur May.
5 Lesser v. Smith,
Blaisdell Co., 56 N. D.
App. 556, 130 S. E. 604
6 Senneff v. Healy,
7

115 Conn. 86, 160 A. 302 (1932); Brudvik v. Frosaker
215, 216 N. W. 891 (1927); Magnet v. Carlton, 34 Ga.
(1925); Curtis v. Le Moyne, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728 (1928).
155 Iowa 82, 135 N. W. 27 (1912).

Dickson v. Patterson, 40 Led. 543 (1895).
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LAW OF WILLS
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE IN A

WiLL.-The general rule, which

has been adopted in England and in most of the American states, is that
a valid bequest or devise may be made by reference to objects and
documents not incorporated in or annexed to the will. This general
rule, as well as the requirements that are necessary in order to have
the rule take effect, are very aptly stated by Chief Justice Gray in an
early Massachusetts case: 1 "If a will, executed and witnessed as required by statute, incorporates in itself by reference any document or
paper not so executed and witnessed, whether the paper referred to be
in the form of a will or codicil, or of a deed or indenture, or of a mere
list or memorandum, the paper referred to, if it was in existence at
the time of the execution of the will, and is identified by clear and
satisfactory proof as the paper referred to therein, takes effect as part
of the will, and should be probated as such."
We should note that three things are necessary in order to incorporate by reference: The will itself must refer to such paper to be incorporated (1) as being in existence at the time of the execution of the
will, (2) in such a way as to reasonably identify such paper in a will,
and (3) in such a way as to show the testator's intention to incorporate
such instrument in his will and to make it a part thereof. The importance of the third requirement has been stressed in an Illinois case: 2
The court said that a mere reference in a will to a writing, where it
does not otherwise clearly appear from the will itself that it is the intention of the testator that such writing be incorporated as a part of
the will, is insufficient to warrant such incorporation.
In the state of New York the legislature has passed a statute which
requires that all wills be executed in the manner prescribed by law.
The statute reads: 3 "Every last will and testament of real or personal
property, or both, shall be executed in the following manner:
1. It shall be subscribed by the testator at the end of the will.
2. Such subscription shall be made by the testator in the presence
of each of the attesting witnesses, or shall be acknowledged by him,
to have been so made, to each of the attesting witnesses.
3. The testator, at the time of making such subscription, or at the
time of acknowledging the same, shall declare the instrument so subscribed, to be his last will and testament.
4. There shall be at least two attesting witnesses, each of whom
shall sign his name as a witness, at the end of the will, at the request
of the testator."
1 Newton v. Seaman's Friend Society, 130 Mass. 91, 39 Am. Dec. 433, (1881).
2 Bottrall v. Spengler, 343 Ill. 476, 175 N. E. 781 (1931).
3 New York Decedent Estate Law, Sect. 21.

NOTES
Chief Justice Denio 4 has refused to allow incorporation by reference
in the state of New York. He assigns as a reason that such allowance
would permit a testator to alter his will otherwise than by an attested
instrument as required by statute. This view of the Chief Justice has
been substantiated by other decisions of the court of appeals in New
York. The court has held that it is the law of the state that an unattested paper, which is of a testamentary nature, cannot be taken as
a part of the will, even though referred to by that instrument. 5
It is important to recognize that this is not a rule that has been
defined by statute, a prohibition that is direct and express, but is a
product of judicial construction, and its form and limits are malleable
and uncertain. Realizing this distinction, Cardozo, also taking into
consideration the purpose of the rule - to safeguard against fraud
and mistake - has stated: 6 that we are not to press the rule to "a
dryly logical extreme." In that case the will directed disposition of
the property as the wife's will might direct. The wills of both husband
and wife were drawn at the same time - in contemplation of a voyage
across the Atlantic. Both were lost on the Lusitania. The court gave
effect to the provision in the will of the husband that incorporated by
reference the will of his wife. There was no question which will of
the wife was meant and also the wife's will disposed of the property
in the same manner as the other provisions of the husband's will.
This somewhat liberal viewpoint towards incorporation by reference
has been failowed in other New York cases. The court in In Re
Rausch's Estate 7 has adopted this view and stated that to insist upon
a will so self contained and self sufficient as to make resort to things
extrinsic needless in every possible contingency is to lose sight of the
significance of language, its functions and capacities. Therefore, if
the particular case presented is one in which opportunity for fraud or
mistake is completely eliminated, the reason for the application of the
rule failed and consequently the rule also fails.
Thus we have seen that if there is no possibility of fraud, incorporation by reference is permitted in'New York. However, even though
permitted in some instances it should be remembered that the requisites
required before incorporation is allowed in other states are also required in the state of New York. Of these requirements the New
York courts 8 levy most stress upon the requirement that such in4 Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N. Y. 9 (1857).
5 In Re Will of O'Neil, 91 N. Y. 523 (1883); Matter of Emmons, 110 App.
Div. 701, 96 N. Y. S. 506 (1900).
6 Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215, 28 N. E. 238 (1891); In Re
Fowles Will, 222 N. Y. 222, 118 N. E. 611 (1918).
7 258 N. Y. 327, 179 N. E. 755 (1932).
8 In Re Martindale's Estate, 127 N. Y. S. 887, 69 Misc. 522 (1909).
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corporation be the intention of the testator. Stress is laid upon this
rule for the reason that incorporation by reference - to guard against
fraud and mistake and the foisting upon the testator of a will which
he did not make or did not intend to make. 9
Eugene C. Wohikorn.

MERETRIcIOUS RELATIONSHIP AS UNDUE INFLUENCE IN MAKING A
WILL.-Of the many types of written instruments the law seeks to

protect, none is more zealously guarded than a man's last will and
testament. Not only does the law set standards, falling below which
the paper becomes a legal nullity, for the execution of a will but it
looks with a cautious and suspicious eye toward any will when the
principal beneficiary under the instrument has occupied an unusual or
unnatural relation to the testator. In this paper we shall consider the
effect of a meretricious relation between the testator and the beneficiary
upon the validity of the bequest.
Historically, it has been the office of the heirs of a testator to assail
the will in which the paramour is the beneficiary upon the grounds
of undue influence. That the contestants should base their action upon
this ground for invalidating the instrument seems obvious for their
contention runs to the testamentary capacity rather than to the lack
of animus testandi and while fraud enters occasionally as a collateral
grounds for overthrowing the will, the contest has usually been based
on undue influence. The question then, put quite simply, is whether
a beneficiary who has sustained an illegal or immoral relationship with
the testator has per se exerted undue influence over the testator and
thereby invalidated the will.
In Corpus Juris we find what is the general rule stated succinctly
to be: "The mere existence of illicit relations does not constitute undue influence. .

.

. And the mere fact that some influence is exercised

by a person sustaining an improper or adulterous relation to the testator
does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence
destroys the testator's free will." I In another section of the same
work we find: "The fact that a testator or testatrix had maintained
an illicit and adulterous relation with a person receiving a legacy or
with a relative of such person, has been held not to authorize a presumption of undue influence by such person." 2
9 In Re Rausch's Will, supra, note 7.
1 43 Corpus Juris Sec. 68.
2 68 Corpus Juris Sec. 452.

NOTES
Perhaps one of the leading cases holding that such unlawful relationship does per se raise a.presumption of undue influence is Dean v.
Negley.3 In this case the court made a distinction between influence
that is exerted by lawful members of a testator's family and that
exerted by his particeps criminis. It called that of the former lawful
and that of the latter unlawful. The court said: "The ordinary influence of a lawful relation must be lawful, even where it affects testamentary dispositions; for this is the natural tendency. The natural
and ordinary influence of an unlawful relation must be unlawful, in
so far as it affects testamentary dispositions favorably to the unlawful
relation and unfavorably to the lawful heirs. Ordinary influence may
be inferred in both cases, where the nature of the will seems to imply
it; but in the former it is right, because the relation is lawful; and in
the latter it may be condemned, together with its effects, because the
relation is unlawful." In the case it was shown also that the testator
had for many years been suffering from a severe cancerous disease.
This fact, together with the facts showing a meretricious relationship
with the beneficiary, was held to constitute undue influence.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Snyder v. Erwin,4 a later
case, reaffirmed the view taken in the Dean case and held that evidence
of a meretricious relation was sufficient in itself to carry the case to
the jury on an issue devisavit vel non for undue influence.
The rule as set forth in the Dean case was not long to remain unassailed. A Maryland court in Saxton v. Krumm 5 not only stated it
to be out of harmony with the general current of authority but expressly abrogated the rule. The court said: "There appears to be F
general concurrence in the authorities that neither an illicit relatior
nor an unjust and unnatural disposition of the property is sufficient
per se to warrant a conclusion of undue influence." It further stated
"While undue influence is more readily imputed where the beneficiary
under a will is a mistress of the testator than where she is his wife,
and while such illegitimate relation is a circumstance proper for the
jury to consider, particularly where there is evidence that the testator's
capacity is impaired, still there is generally held to be no presumption
of undue influence arising from such relation merely. .. "
In 1917 in Re Watmough's Estate6 the Pennsylvania Court abrogated the rule it had formulated in the Dean case and held that the
illicit relation existing between the beneficiary and the testator was
not of itself sufficient to invalidate the will because of undue influence.
The court said: "Granting the improper relation charged, such circumstance in itself would not make the will illegal. A testator, so
3 41 Pa. 312 (1862).
4 79 AU. 124, 229 Pa. 644 (1911).
5 68 Ati. 1056, 17 Md. 393 (1908).
6

101 AU. 957, 258 Pa. 22 (1917).
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long as he is a free agent, has a right to give his property to whom
he pleases; nor does the fact that the chief beneficiary in the will with
whom he sustained improper relations raise any presumption that the
will was made under a constraining influence exerted by the paramour."
Such language sounded the death knell to the rule set down in Dean
v. Negley, supra.
In Kustus V. Hager 7 the same court again followed its new rule
which conformed to the general American rule, when it affirmed a
lower court's decision allowing probate of a will in which the beneficiary was the testator's mistress and excluded the heirs. The court
said: "Whatever may be said in condemnation of the relation sustained by the testator to the plaintiff on the ground of its immorality
and the likelihood of such relation resulting in family estrangement,
with impairment of individual character, none of these things of themselves can operate to defeat a will, giving to the partner in guilt a
share of the estate be it large or small, where the testator at the time
of making the will was master of himself."
A Maryland court in Griffith v. Benzinger 8 found that the relationship, though of itself could not be said to raise a presumption of
undue influence, coupled with the testator's degenerated mental and
physical condition, was sufficient to invalidate the will. In this case
the court laid down the general rule to be: "The mere fact that a
person maintained illicit relations with another in whose favor a
testamentary disposition was made by such person does not in itself
raise a presumption of law or of fact that such disposition was obtained by fraud or undue influence. But the fact that such relations
existed between the decedent and the sole beneficiary under the proposed will is a fact to be considered in connection with other facts
bearing upon the question in determining the weight and sufficiency of
evidence adduced to show that a will was made as a result of undue
influence or fraud."
In Re Gaddis' Will 9 the court followed the general rule and said:
"The fact that the relations between the testator and Miss Cox existed
in violation of law, or that such relations were immoral is not sufficient
ground for invalidating the will."
The Alabama Supreme Court adheres to the general rule for in
Hobson v. Morgan 10 we find the court saying: "There appears to be
a general concurrence in the authorities that an illicit relation is not
sufficient per se to warrant a conclusion of undue influence, and that
no presumption of undue influence arises merely from the fact that a
7
8

112 Ad. 45, 269 Pa. 103 (1920).
125 At. 512, 144 Md. 575 (1924).

9

126 Atl. 287, 96 N. 3. Eq. 668 (1924).

10

110 So. 406, 215 Ala. 274 (1926).
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man, who is of sound mind, makes a will in favor of his mistress, or of
one with whom his relations have been meretricious." The court went
on to conclude that such evidence was to be considered in connection
with any evidence tending to establish undue influence but is not of
itself sufficient.
Not directly in point but of general interest as concerning undue
influence and immoral surroundings is in Re Swartz,11 in which the
beneficiaries were inmates of a brothel. The will was attacked on the
grounds of undue influence because the beneficiaries were in the room
at the time of the making and also because they stood in immoral
relations to the testatrix since they worked for the testratrix in her
brothel. The will was held to be valid and the beneficiaries took to
the exclusion of the heirs.
One of the most recent cases on point is In Re Kelly's Estate 12 in
which the court, although sustaining the general doctrine found evidence
of undue influence exerted by the mistress of the testator and decreed
the will invalid. The court said in adjudication: "The mere existence
of such a relationship does not render invalid a bequest made to the
paramour, because one possessed on an estate may settle his bounty
upon an immoral person if he chooses; nor does such a relatioiship
create a presumption that the beneficiary exerted undue influence in
obtaining the testamentary recognition. But, since the relationship
which arises out of illegal amours may provide favorable opportunities
for the exertion of undue influence, proof of the relationship is admissible when undue influence is charged."
That a man, possessed of a mental and physical capacity, has a
right to confer his worldly goods upon whomsoever it pleases him, be
it an arbitrary or capricious choice, cannot be seriously doubted. Any
atten'ipt by the courts to limit his field of testamentary recognition
would be challenging practically every will for it would in effect be
substituting the conscience of the court or jury for that of the testator.
That a man's relation with a beneficiary has been reprehensible as
judged from current moral standards or that he excludes his natural
objects of his bounty are indeed appalling situations but as long as he
executed his will consistent with the law, to limit his scope of testamentary disposition would not only be against the might of current
judicial opinion, but would abrogate one of the most fundamental rights
of man - the right to bestow his property on the beneficiary of his
choice, irrespective of the relation that the beneficiary sustained to the
testator.
FrancisJ. Paulson.
11

192 Pac. 203, 79 Okla. 191, 16 A. L. R. 450.

12 46 Pac. (2d) 84, 150 Ore. 598 (1935).
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REVOCATION OF A WILL.-There are several statutes in Indiana regarding the revocation of wills. As to the manner of revocation the
following statute applies: "No will in writing, nor any part thereof,
except as in this act provided, shall be revoked, unless the testator, or
some other person in his presence and by his direction, with intent
to revoke, shall destroy or mutilate the same; or such testator shall
execute other writing for that purpose, signed, subscribed and attested
as required in the preceding section. And, if, after the making of any
will, the testator shall execute a second, a revocation of the second
shall not revive the first will, unless it shall appear by the terms of such
revocation to have been his intent to revive it, or, unless, after such
revocation, he shall duly republish the previous will."'
It has been
held that the requirements of the statute touching the revocation of
wills must be strictly followed. In Runkle v. Gates, the court said:
"an intention to revoke a will is utterly inoperative unless there be
some act done in pursuance of that intention, and such act be one
of revocation, within the requirements of the statute." 2

The mere intention or desire on the part of a testator that his will
shall be revoked, or a belief on his part that it has been destroyed,
when it has not, will not amount to a revocation of the will.3 There
must actually be an act as well as the intention. Nor is a mere declaration of an intent to revoke a will, by the testator, sufficient to constitute
a revocation if the declaration is never carried into effect. 4 What then
is sufficient action to revoke a will? In Woodfill v. Patton, the court
said: "In order that there should be a valid revocation of a will there
must be the concurrence of two things, the intention to revoke, and
the act manifesting the intention . . . There must not only be an act

of revocation, but the act must be such as the statute recognizes as a
proper manifestation of the intention to revoke. The act will not
operate as a revocation, no matter how strongly and unequivocally it
may show an intention to revoke, unless it be such an act as the statute
prescribes." 5 The court went on to say that the erasure by a testator
of his signature to a will, designedly and deliberately made, accompanied
by the intention to revoke, must be deemed a destruction of the will,
and purposely drawing a pencil, or other implement which erases,
cancels or obliterates, over the signature to a will by the maker, must
be deemed to constitute such a mutilation as takes from the instrument
an element essential to its validity, and is therefore a revocation thereof.
I

Burns Section 7-301.
2 11 Ind. 95 (1858).
a Woodfill v. Patton, 76 Ind. 575, 40 Am. Rep. 269 (1881). Also 2 Supra.
4 Belshaw v. Chitwood, 141 Ind. 377, 40 N. E. 908 (1895).

5 3 Supra.
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Nor will a destruction of the will during a temporary fit of insanity
be sufficient to revoke the will.6 Such a will may be established as
a valid will if sufficient proof is presented.
The execution of a will sometimes revokes a prior one. The
court said in Burns, Executor, et al v. Travis,7 "The execution of a
new will making another and inconsistent disposition of the testator's
property operates as a revocation of a former will disposing of the
same property, and this is so whether the former will is expressly revoked by the later one or not." In Pfaffenberger v. Pfaffenberger, the
court said that the statutes require the same formality and the same
competency of attesting witnesses in the execution of a revocation as
8
is required in the execution of a will.
In a recent case it was held that a valid will may be revoked by the
testator by his drawing lines across the face of the will and his signature and the attesting clause, and writing on the face of the will the
word "void," attested by his initials, even though the will is left intact
and legible.0 Another recent case defines the word "mutilate," as
something less than total destruction and further held that the manner
of mutilation is not of controlling importance.' 0
The next statute we will look at has to do with the subsequent
marriage of the testator. The statute says: "If any male or female
who now under the law is qualified to execute a will and who, being
unmarried, shall execute a will disposing of his or her property or
any portion of the same, and who, after the execution of such will
shall become married, then such will executed prior to such marriage
shall be null and void." 11 Before the above statute was passed the
rule was that the marriage of a man who had previously executed a
will did not revoke it;12 on the other hand an unmarried woman who
made a will and later married found her will revoked. 13
As to the birth of a child the statute says: "If, after the making of
a will, the testator shall have born to him legitimate issue, who shall
survive him, or shall have posthumous issue, then such will shall be
deemed revoked, unless provision shall have been made in such will
for such issue." 14 In construing this statute the court said, in Hughes
v. Hughes, "Under our statute, the birth of a child, after the execution
6 Forbing v. Weber, 99 Ind. 588 (1884).
7 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 766 (1888). Also see:

Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29,

55 N. E. 179 (1899).

8 189 Ind. 507, 127 N. E. 766 (1920).
9 Tinsley v. Carvile, 212 Ind. 675, 10 N. E. (2d) 597 (1937).
10 9 Supra.
11 Burns Section 7-302.
12 Bowers v. Bowers, 53 Ind. 430 (1876).
13 Vail v. Lindsay, 67 Ind. 528 (1879).
14

Burns Section 7-303.
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of a will, works an entire revocation of the will, unless provision shall
have been made in such will for such issue. Such is the plain, express,
and undoubted requirement of the statute and it is our imperative duty
to carry into execution the legislative intention." 15
As to the adoption of a child after the making of a will, the court
said in Davis v. Fogle that such action does not act to revoke the
will.16 Nor does the birth and acknowledgment of an illegitimate
17
child by the testator subsequent to the making of a will revoke it.
The statute further provides: "But in case such child dies without issue, and the wife of such testator be living, the estate of the
testator, except the wife's interest therein, shall descend according to
the terms of the will; and in case of the death of the wife, and also
of the child, without issue, the whole of such estate shall descend as
directed in the will, unless such child have a wife living at his death,
in which case, such wife shall hold such estate to her use so long as
she remains unmarried." 18
The last problem that we will look at is conveying land so as to revoke a will. It has been held that the conveyance by a testator of
all his lands operates as a revocation. 19 The conveyance must be
valid, however, an invalid conveyance will not revoke a will.20
Thus we have seen that a will may be revoked in many ways, and
that to accomplish revocation both intention and an appropriate act
must be present. We have further seen that the subject of revocation
of a will in Indiana is covered by several statutes. These statutes it
seems have been enacted to prevent validly executed wills from being
set aside too easily by scheming heirs. Statutes regarding revocation
are construed strictly and they should be.
Arthur M. Diamond.

WHAT AN ATTORNEY SHOULD HAVE A WITNESS OF A WILL SAY

THE TESTATOR.-In attacking a problem of this nature it is basic that the first point to be
made is that in most jurisdictions, by statute, attestation and subscription of a will by witnesses is essential to the validity of the will whether
REGARDING THE TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY OF

15
16

37 Ind. 183 (1871). Also see Morse v. Morse, 42 Ind. 365 (1873).
124 Ind. 41, 23 N. E. 860 (1890).

Eckart v. Eckart, 95 Ind. App. 148, 163 N. E. 288 (1932).
18 Burns Section 7-304.
19 Bowen v. Johnson, 6 Ind. 110, 61 Am. Dec. 110 (1854).
17

20

Bennett v. Gaddis, 79 Ind. 347 (1881).
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the property passed therein is real or personal.1 The reason for the
presence of such statutes requiring that a will be attested and subscribed
by witnesses is to remove uncertainty as to the execution of wills and
to safeguard testators against frauds. Before going on to this point
it is necessary to point out that this paper has for its purpose the
discussion of the topic named and will not deviate to bring in such
facts as the proper method for the witness to sign the will, the publication of the will to him and so forth.
The next point that must be discussed is a consideration of the facts
which the witnesses attest. As a general rule the attestation required
of the witnesses consists in their seeing that those things exist and are
done which the statutes require to exist and be done in order to make
the instrument in law the will of the testator.2 Another general rule
of wide application is that witnesses attest not only the due execution
of the will by the testator, but also his mental capacity to make a
valid will, at the time of the execution of the same.3 Furthermore
one who signs the will as a witness of the instrument declares that the
testator is mentally capable of making the will.4 This rule has been
held by a minority of courts though a large number of states imply
the same view. These courts proceed on the theory that if the witness
knew that the testator did not have the mental capacity to make a
will he would not, if he were a credible person of normal intelligence,
subscribe to the will in the first place. As a matter of fact several
courts have been bold enough to come out and make the ruling that if
the witnesses think that the testator lacks in capacity to make their
will they should refuse to attest and subscribe the same.5 Other courts
have held that notwithstanding the fact that it is the duty of the
parties called on to witness a will to give attestation to the testator's
testamentary capacity, failure on their part to testify to the testamentary capacity of the testator will not invalidate the will.6 This
case, however, appears to be in the absolute minority in view of the
fact that this point of law has never been followed in later South
Carolina decisions, and furthermore, no other states seem to have
1 Cunningham v. Hallyburton, 342 Ill. 442, 174 N. E. 550 (1930); .Merkle
v. Merkle, 85 Cal. App. 87, 259 Pac. 969 (1927); Hooks v. Stamper, 18 Ga. 471
(1355); Orth v. Orth, 145 Ind. 184, 42 N. E. 277, 44 N. E. 17 (1895); In Re
Boynes Will, 23 Iowa 354 (1867); Burch v. Burget, 130 Kan. 243, 285 Pac. 574
(1930); Birch v. Jefferson County Court, 244 Ky. 425, 51 S. W. (2d) 258 (1932);
Murdock v. Bridges, 91 Me. 124 (1897); Simpkins v. 016 Colony Trust Co., 254
Mass. 576, 151 N. E. 87 (1926); In Re Judge's Will, 252 N. Y. S. 500 (1931).
2 Nunn v. Ehlert, 218 Mass. 471, 106 N. E. 163 (1914).
3 Beck v. Last, 303 Ill. 549, 136 N. E. 475 (1922); Hill v. Kehr, 228 I1.
204, 81 N. E. 848 (1907).
4 Egbert v. Egbert, 78 Pa. 326 (1875).
5 Hawes v. Humphrey, 9 Pick. Mass. 350, 20 Am. D. 481 (1830); Bruce v.
Shuler, 108 Va. 670, 62 S. E. 973 (1908).
6 Mordecai v. Canty, 86 S. C. 470, 68 S. E. 1049 (1910).
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taken the same view as South Carolina on this point. A special search
was made as to Illinois decisions and none holding along the lines of
the South Carolina court could be found, therefore, we might be able
to infer from this that Illinois has either not passed on the point involved in the principal case or it rejects the rule of the South Carolina
court.
The next step to set up, it is apparent, is should an attorney have
witnesses make statements regarding the testamentary capacity of the
testator, and just what weight would be afforded to such testimony by the
court if it were brought in as evidence in a contest proceeding? On
this point the Illinois court has been rather firm. There are only three
possibilities that exist, namely: (1) That they afford such testimony
more weight than that of other witnesses, (2) that they afford such
testimony on the part of witnesses the same amount of weight as that
of third parties, or (3) that they afford the testimony of witnesses
less weight than that of third parties. Of these three possibilities the
Illinois courts have chosen to follow the second, namely that they will
afford the same amount of weight to the testimony of witnesses of a
will regarding the testamentary capacity of the testator as afforded
to the testimony on the same topic of third parties, i.e. qualified third
parties, such as close friends, business associates, etc. Probably the
latest case on this point is that of Brown v. Riggin, in which the
court although not stating that the testimony of the attesting witnesses
was not entitled to greater weight than the testimony of other, held
that an instruction which assigned more weight to the testimony of
nurses and others, such as attendants, than to the opinions of the subscribing witnesses as to the testamentary capacity of the testator was
erroneous. 7 It is evident from this case that the Illinois court was invoking the equal weight rule even though it did the same in a somewhat haphazard round about way. In an earlier case, Nieman v.
Schnitker,s the court held that an instruction that the mere fact that a
person is a subscribing witness to a will does not entitle his opinion
as to the competency of the testator to execute the same to any more
weight than the opinion of any equally credible and intelligent witness,
who has the same opportunity of judging, and that his testimony may
not be entitled to as much weight as that of some other witness who
had better opportunity of observing the decedent at or about the time
of the execution of the wills was held to be erroneous. The court said:
"There is nothing in the record showing that any other witness than
the subscribing witnesses was present at the time of the execution
of the will, nor is there any evidence showing there were other witnesses
who had better opportunities of observing the deceased at the time.
The question of the weight of the testimony of the witnesses is a ques94 III. 560 (1880).
8 181 IH. 400, 55 N. E. 151 (1899).
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tion to be determined by the jury and their province should not be
invaded by the court as it is done by this instruction, where it is
stated that the testimony of the subscribing witnesses is not entitled
to as much weight as that of some of the other witnesses who had
better opportunity of observing the deceased. Whether there were
any other witnesses who had better opportunities of observing the
deceased, and the weight of the testimony, were both questions for the
jury and not for the court, and this instruction impliedly suggests to
the jury that some other witness or witnesses had better opportunity
of observing the deceased than the subscribing witnesses." This last
statement by the court would lead one to infer that the court of Illinois
had at an early date favored the rule of the court of South Carolina
which said that the testimony of the witnesses as to the testamentary
capacity of the testator goes to their credibility. This, however, upon
close examination can be distinguished from the South Carolina case because here the court says that the juror shall listen to both sides of the
story, that of the witness as of the third parties and determine for themselves what weight they will give to their respective testimony. They
agree that some weight must be given to both, but just what that weight
shall be is for the jury to determine. This view, it appears, is no
longer prevalent when we refer to the case cited just before the principal case.
From the facts presented in the first part of the paper and also
from the cases cited it is possible to draw the following conclusions:
In Illinois, first if you are going to have the witnesses to the will say
anything whatsoever about the testamentary capacity of the testator,
then too much confidence should not be placed in such evidence because we have seen that it is afforded only as much weight as is afforded to testimony of outside parties who have had opportunity to
observe the testator. But even in view of the fact that their testimony
is afforded only this amount of weight the situation may arise where
there are no outside parties who have watched the testator and then
the testimony of the witnesses will be regarded highly. Such being
the case it might be best that in every case of, this type as a matter
of fact in every will you draft, it might be well to have the witnesses
say something, no matter how little which would be indicative of the
testator's testamentary capacity. If possible have him make a written
statement which should be signed by the witness and have the same
notarized and the original appended to the will itself.
Joseph Brady.
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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF A DECEDENT'S ESTATE IN HIS LEASES.Let us assume that X leased the Black Building from C for $5,000 per
year for fifteen years and then subleases to various tenants for $15,000
per year. He then leases the White Building from D in 1932 for
$8,000 per year and subleases to various tenants for $7,500 per year.
In 1933 he buys the Gray Building from F and leases it to G for 15
years at $6,000 per year payable monthly in advance. On June 30th,
1935 X dies and G goes bankrupt on the same day with the rent due
June 1st unpaid.
This leaves the heirs with many problems and the attorney for the
heirs or estate with many headaches. The first question to be answered
is that if X's heir, X Jr. desires to keep the lease on the Black Building and repudiate the lease and subleases on the White Building, may
he do so?
The lease by which X is entitled to the possession and enjoyment
of the Black Building and the White Building constitute tenancies for
years since the term is for 15 years and one year respectively. A tenancy for years is one which is created by a contract for the use of lands
and tenements for a determinate period, with the recompense of rent
in kind or money. It is denominated a term, because its duration is
absolutely defined.'
As a general rule a lease for a term of years is not terminated by
the death of the lessee before the expiration of the term. And usually
in such a case the leasehold as personal estate passes to the personal
representative of the lessee, and the lessee's estate remains liable on
the covenants in the lease for the payment of rent just as on the other
contracts of the decedent for the payment of money.
In Miller v. Ready 2 the leading Indiana case on the subject, where
the question arose on the death of the lessee of an unexpired tenancy
for years, the court held that "an ordinary lease of real estate is not
such a personal contract as is annulled or extinguished by the death
of either of the parties thereto (thus applying to sub-lessees as well).
In the case of the death of the lessee, the term or the unexpired portion
thereof becomes a part of the personal assets of the estate, to be inventoried, appraised, and sold as other personal property. Until in
some manner the lease is released or discharged, it devolved upon the
administrator to perform the covenants of the lease, and he is liable
for the payment of the rent reserved, to the extent that he has assets
in his hands." California courts are in complete accord with Indiana
on this, point and hold that the estate's liability arises out of privity of
3
contract based on the lease from the lessor to the lessee.
McAdam, Landlord and Tenant, pp. 47-48.
2 59 Ind. App. 195, 108 N. E. 605 (1915).
S Southern Pacific Co. v. Swanson, 73 Cal. App. 229, 238 Pac. 736 (1925).
1
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Even though the lease restricts the use to the lessees, a Massachusetts
court held there was no implied condition that the lease was terminable
4
on the death of the parties.
A Kentucky court stated just what the executor of an estate may
do with regard to property which the decedent had leased and which
term was unexpired when it said that (a) he may keep the property,
thereby charging the estate with the performance of the terms and conditions of the lease; (b) he may, if the lease does not prevent it, sublease the premises, but this would not, of course release the estate of
its obligation to satisfy the terms and conditions of the lease as between it and the landlord; (c) he may surrender the leased property
to the landlord, and refuse to have anything further to do with it, thereby working a cancellation of the lease; but the doing of this would
subject the estate to a suit for damages by the landlord for the breach
of the contract. 5
It is well settled by the authorities that a contract of this character
is not terminated by the death of the lessee, and that his estate continues liable for the performance of the conditions of the lease until
it expires, and the obligations of a lessee under the contract passes on
his death to his personal representative, who assumes in his fiduciary
capacity, the performance of the contract in the same manner that its
performance could have been demanded of the lessee. 6
Illinois has held that while a landlord may covenant in a lease that
it may be terminated by the death of the lessee, still if he intended
that the lessee should have a limited time in which to cancel the lease,
he should have plainly stated such in the lease."
Though there is no case on the termination of a lease by the death
of the lessee in Illinois, it may be presumed that the courts would tend
toward the reasoning that the lease would not be terminated unless
expressly provided for in the lease in view of the above case.
Assuming that X, Jr. is the personal representative of his father, X,
as well as his heir, we hold that he must carry out the terms and conditions of the leases on the Black and on the White Buildings, or surrender the lease and suffer a suit for damages on breach of contract
brought by the landlord. So, too, if he takes as an heir under the will
and accepts, he must assume his father's obligations under the lease.
The second question that must be disposed of is what interest, if
any, does X Senior's surviving wife have in the property? The Illinois
statute on the subject of dower reads as follows: "A surviving spouse,
4

Israel v. Beale, 270 Mass. 61, 169 N. E. 777 (1930).

5 Brown v. U. S. Trust Co., 185 Ky. 747, 215 S. W. 815 (1919).
6 16 R. C. L. p. 855.
7 Storey's Estate v. 199 Lake Shore Drive, Inc., 317 Ill.
App. 380, 45 N. E.
(2d) 984 (1942).
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whether husband or wife, is endowed of a third part of all real estate
of which the decedent was seized of an estate of inheritance at any
time during the marriage unless the dower has been released or is
barred. Real estate contracted for by the deceased spouse in his lifetime, the title to which may be completed after his death, and equitable
estates are subject to dower. There is no estate of curtesy." 8
As a result the surviving spouse has a third interest in the rents
from the sublessees of the Black Building and the White Building,
since rent is a chattel real, and passes to heirs rather than the personal
representative of the deceased subject to the dower interest of the
widow plus whatever is acquired from the bankrupt estate of G, plus
her 1/3 dower interest of the Gray Building of which X was the owner
in fee.
A lease is an estate of inheritance in so far as the grantee of the
lessees have the same rights in the property as the grantor 9 and as
such the wife's claim of dower is valid.
The third and last question is how much, if anything may X, Jr.
claim from the bankrupt estate of G and what is the status of G's
lease?
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 an adjudication in bankruptcy
did not dissolve or terminate the contractual relations of the bankrupt,' 0 and the tenants' liability for future rent remained enforceable
as installments of rent fell due. Under such a provision the landlord
was helpless as his right to collect rent from a bankrupt tenant was
valueless to overcome these difficulties the Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act in 1934 by adding to the group of provable claims
against the bankrupt estate, claims for damages respecting executory
contracts including future rents, but the claim of a landlord for injury
resulting from the rejection by the trustee of an unexpired lease of real
estate shall in no event be allowed in an amount exceeding the rent
reserved by the lease, without acceleration, for the year next succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises plus an amount equal to
the unpaid rent accrued up to said date." As a result of the amendment it can now be said that bankruptcy now terminates the relation
2
of landlord and tenant.'
Upon the rejection of the lease by the trustee in bankruptcy the
landlord's claim for injury is limited to an amount not exceeding the
rent reserved "for the three years next succeeding the date of surrender of the premises to the landlord or the date of reentry of the
s

Jones Illinois Statutes sec. 110.266.

9 Ibid. 72:15.
10 Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (1905).
11 In Re Owl Drug Company, 12 Fed. Supp. 447 (1935).
12 Remington on Bankruptcy sec. 795.
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landlord whichever occurs first. The subsequent repossession and control of the landlord did not destroy the provability of a claim under
Section 77B and he could recover the difference between the present
rental value and the rent which the bankrupt had agreed to pay.
In 1938 the Chandler Act was passed by the Congress which again
modified the Act by providing: "that the claim of a landlord for
damages for injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired lease
of real estate shall in no event be allowed in an amount exceeding the
rent reserved by the lease, without acceleration, for the year next
succeeding the date of the surrender of the premises to the landlord or
the date of reentry of the landlord, whichever first occurs, whether before or after bankruptcy, plus an amount equal to the unpaid rent
accrued without acceleration, up to such date." 13
Provision of this section making one year's rent following re-entry
or surrender the maximum recoverable by the landlord governs the
ascertainment of how much the landlord is entitled to, less the credit
to the tenant on rent derived by a release. 14
Thus assuming the lease to be rejected on the adjudication of bankruptcy on June 30th, 1935, X, Jr. will have a provable claim against
the bankrupt estate for the rent due the first day of June, 1935, plus
the rent due up to June 30th, 1936. Under this settlement the bankrupt estate may either occupy the Gray Building for that time or surrender the premises, in which case X, Jr. may re-enter and release
and credit the bankrupt estate by deducting the amount of rent he
receives from such release from the year's rent for which the estate
is liable.
John F. Power.

RIGHTS

IN LAND.-At

the common law the maxim cujus est solum

ejus est usque ad coelum, he who owns the surface owns up to
the sky, was used to describe what the ownership of property
prescribed. However this maxim proved to be inadequate as far as
aviation rights were concerned. The court in the Johnson case
decided the question as to the applicability of the maxim was concerned when applied to air rights in the aviation field. The court
said: "This rule like many aphorisms of the law, is a generality, and
does not have its origin in legislation, but was adopted in an age of
primitive industrial development, by the courts of England, long prior
to the American Revolution, as a comprehensive statement of the landIs Title 11 U. S. C. A. sec. 103.
14 In Re -B..Westermann Co., 51 Fed. Supp. 776 (1943).
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owners' rights at a time when any practical use of the upper air was
not considered or thought practical, and when such aerial trespasses
as did occur were relatively near to the surface of the land, and were
such as to exercise some direct harmful influence upon the owner's use
and enjoyment of the land. A wholly different situation is now presented. The upper air is a heritage common to all of the people, and
its reasonable use ought not to be hampered by an ancient artificial
maxim of the law as is here involved." 1
Thus from the previous case we find that the land owner does not
own up to the sky and 'that the mere flying of a plane over his land
is not enough to constitute a trespass. We immediately begin to
wonder if an airplane can commit a trespass to the land and if so what
would constitute a trespass. The answer is suggested by a Pennsylvania case 2 that held that invasions of airspace are trespasses only
when they interfere with a proper enjoyment of reasonable use of the
surface.
Therefore we note that an unreasonable use of the airspace above
land will be a trespass. From this it would seem that the owner of
land has, conversely, the right to make a reasonable use of his land or
as stated by the court in the Swetland case 3 the surface owner has a
right to the use of which he may reasonably expect to use but as to
what he may not reasonably expect to use he has no right except to
prevent an unreasonable use by others. Of course it is apparent that
this reasonable or unreasonable use of land has reference to the height
of the structures on the land and also to the height of the particular
flight in question. The Department of Commerce and the legislatures
have passed laws regulating the height at which airplanes may be
flown. However it is important to recognize that these laws were passed
for the public welfare and not for the protection of the individual landowner, for the height at which an airplane operator may pass above
the surface without trespassing depends on particular facts and is unaffected by Department of Commerce regulations. 4 So far we have
seen that traversing the airspace above the land is not of itself a
trespass and that to constitute a trespass the flight must cause injury
to the possession of the land, therefore it seems that injury to the land
will be enough for a suit for damages, but recognizing the fact that
mere damages are not always adequate relief and that the land owner
would rather stop this unreasonable use by another of his property we
next turn to injunctive relief. The courts have been uniform in holding that in addition to the above there must be proof of actual damage
1 Johnson v. Curtiss N. W. Airplane Co., Minn. 235 CCH 322, US Av R 42,
(1928).

Gay & Rush Hospital v. Taylor, Pa. 235 CCH 1754, US Av R 146 (1934).
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation, 55 Fed. (2d) 201, (1930).
4 Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 Fed. Supp. 977, (1936).
2
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before an injunction will be granted on the trespass theory. 5 In fact
it has even been established 6 that although there might be flights at
such low altitudes as to constitute a trespass this will not be sufficient
for the awarding of an injunction where the trespass does not do any
actual damage to the property or its use.
From the foregoing discussion we can realize that it is very difficult
to obtain an injunction on the trespass theory, and that if the landowner had to depend upon this remedy his rights would often be infringed. However, there is still another theory by which a land owner
may secure adequate relief in the form of an injunction and that is
upon the nuisancb theory.
At the outset it is important to recognize that an airport is a lawful business and is not a nuisance per se but may become one because
of unsuitable location, improper construction, or unreasonable opera7
tion.
The first point to be considered is the location of an airport when
contemplating bringing an action upon the nuisance theory because
the courts 8 have held that such noises and dusts that are created by
the necessary and proper operation of a properly located airport are
not sufficient to constitute a nuisance, although they result in injury
and inconvenience to the adjoining land owners. Of course the same
court, in another case,9 has held that if the airport were improperly
located then injury to the comfort and use of a house would constitute
a nuisance affording ground for the recovery of damages and also for
the granting of an injunction. This same viewpoint has been accepted
by other courts and it has been held 10 that airplanes may be flown at
proper heights over the land below and even. though there may be
noises and annoyances caused thereby they will be considered as
"damnum absque injuria." However they (the aircraft) may not land
or take off at low altitudes and in such proximity of others so as to
cause a nuisance or a continuing trespass.
From the foregoing we cannot help but think that if the airport is
properly located then regardless of the manner of operation an
airport will not constitute a nuisance, but this is not the fact for it
has been held that an airport whether or not properly located or
whether its operation constitutes only a reasonable use of the property
in question is not controlling. The question is whether or not, no
5 Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 Fed. (2d) 755, (1936).
6 Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 69 A. L. R. 300, 170
N. E. 385, (1930).
7

Vanderslice v. Shawn, Del. Ch., 66 CCH 2305, US Av R 11, 27 At]. (2d)

87 (1942).

Delta Air Co. v. Kernsey, 193 Ga. 863, 20 S. E. (2d) 245 (1942).
9 Thraser v. Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934).
8

10

Warren Tp. v. Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N. W. (2d) 134 (1944).
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matter how it is operated or how reasonable such use may be, it does
constitute a nuisance to the plaintiffs."
From this discussion it is apparent that the question as to whether
or not an airport is a nuisance depends upon the facts of a particular
case. But how about the airport that is only being contemplated and
has not been built as yet? It would seem that it would be easier to
get an injunction before the airport was built and large sums of money
expended, but such is not the case, for in a recent Michigan case,12 the
court held that an injunction could not be granted before the erection
of the airport because an airport is not a nuisance per se and whether
or not it would become a nuisance in fact could not be determined until
after the proposed airport was in operation.
The whole matter of the rights of a landowner as opposed to those
of an airport have been briefly summarized by the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in a recent case 13 where
the court stated that: "Any use of the airspace over land which is injurious to the land or impairs or interferes with the possession or enjoyment thereof is unlawful. The coming of the airplane has not taken
away any of the rights of the landowner to the use and enjoyment of
his land and the airspace above it. The privilege or right of airplanes
to fly through the airspace recognized by the common law ...

is limited

to that portion of the airspace which the landowner does not need or
want and the use of which does not interfere with the use, occupation,
or enjoyment of the land or the airspace above it by the landowner."
Eugene C. Wohlhorn.

SALEs-Bulk Sales Laws.-Bulk sales statutes have now been passed
in all of the forty-eight states. The movement was put in action by
the National Association of Credit Men for the protection of jobbers
and wholesalers.' The common-law rule was much less strict on the
matter than the new statutes are. The old common-law allowed the
creditor to follow the goods and subject them to his claims as if no
sale had occurred so long as they have not reached the hands of a
2
purchaser for value without notice.

Most of the statutes hold that if such a conveyance is made and all
the requirements of the statute are not fulfilled, the transaction is void
11
12

Gay & Rush Hospital v. Taylor, supra.
Warren Tp. v. Detroit, supra.

13

Guith v. Consumers Power Co., 36 Fed. Supp. 21 (1940).

Billig, Bulk Sales Laws, A Study in Economic Adjustment, 77 U. of Pa.
Law Rev. 72.
2 Vold on Sales, P. 404.
1

NOTES
as to the creditors. If the parties to the sale comply with all the*requirements of the statute, the creditors will be given ample opportunity
to take whatever action they deem necessary.$
Typical of most Bulk Sales Laws, is the Minnesota act 4 which contains in general, the following: On any bulk sale made in Minnesota,
at least five days notice must be given on the following; i.e. the notice
must be given to the seller's creditors. The seller and purchaser must
make an inventory of the material and the cost of such material, and
of each article sold. The purchaser. must, in good faith, make an inquiry as to the creditors of the seller and the amount owed to each.
The purchaser must also inform the creditors of the proposed sale.
There is, naturally, a variation between the various state statutes, but
on a whole, they are intended for the same purpose, and their construction is highly correlated.
The term "bulk" is usually interpreted to mean a stock of merchandise. It is difficult to understand just what this means. 5 The
term has been held not to apply to fixtures in a store; 6 nor equipment;
appliances; 7 a stock of raw materials; 8 or a restaurant's stock of
provisions. 9 The exact determination of just what the term applies
to would require a close study of all the material on the subject for
each individual state, and how each state wants the term interpreted.
In Van Genderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, 10 the court held that it did
not apply to the sald of a fleet of busses. Here, D purchased a
fleet of busses which had been used for the transportation of passengers.
There had been no notice given by the vendor nor the purchaser to the
creditor P. P filed a complaint to have the conveyance set aside as
fraudulent under the bulk sales act of that state. A motion made
to have the bill stricken was denied, but this was reversed on appeal,
where it was held that the bulk sales law does not apply to the sale of
a fleet of busses for passenger use.
Where, in most cases, it is necessary for the purchaser to give notice
to the creditors of the proposed sale, it has been held that the purchaser
cannot be held liable if the vendor used fraud in not divulging all the
names of his creditors to the purchaser.1 1 In another case, however,
3 Escale v. Mark, 43 Nev. Rep. 172, 183 P. 387, 5 A. L. R. 1512 (1919).
4

Mason's Minnesota Statutes, 8473.

5 Swift and Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N. C. 487, 101 S. E. 8 (1919).
6 Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N. Dak. 116, 155 N. W. 683 (1915).
7 Bowen v. Quigley, 165 Mich. 337, 130 N. W. 690 (1911).
8 Lee v. Gillen and Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N. W. 278 (1912).
9 See footnote 5.

Van Genderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, 107 N. J. Eq. 217, 151 AtI. 605 (1930).
11 McKelvey v. John Schnapp and Sons Drug Co., 143 Ark. 477, 220 S. W.
827 (1920).
10
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the court was more liberal and allowed the sale to be considered 'void
only as to the creditor who did not receive notice. 12
The question as to whether or not creditors shall have the right to
follow the goods down thru subpurchasers is in dispute. This is a
most liberal attitude and the weight of authority feels that the creditor
has his rights only against the original purchaser, even though the
original sale was void.' 3 The reasoning behind this is that the courts
feel that if the subpurchasers were open to attack, it would be a restraint
on trade and also, an undue hardship upon innocent purchasers, which,
of course, the legislature did not intend.14
The courts have generally been quite liberal in their interpretatio,
of the various acts for the benefit of the creditors. This is done for
the protection of property and to protect business. Attachment or Execution is usually used by the creditors and has been held to be a good
method. 15 It has also been held that the creditor may sue in trover
proceedings considering the buyer a converter. 16 If, as mentioned
in a prior paragraph, the purchaser has already disposed of the goods,
17
the purchaser can be subjected to garnishment for the value.
Some courts have given a much stricter interpretation to the bulk
sales laws, but these are in the minority. It has been held that the
creditor must proceed in equity to have the sale set aside.1s
Roger D. Gustafson.

SALES-THE

BULK

SALES

LAW AND

UNLIQUIDATED
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CON-

all the states have, since the turn of the century, enacted bulk sales laws designed to prevent the passing of an unqualified title to a stock of goods sold in bulk without payment of the
seller's creditors. In general, the statutes provide that the sale of all
or any portion of a stock of merchandise, otherwise than in the ordinary
course of trade, shall be void and fraudulent as against creditors of the
seller unless the seller delivers to the purchaser a list of his creditors
and the purchaser in turn notifies such creditors of the proposed sale
a stipulated time, usually five days, in advance.
TINGENT CLAIMS.-Nearly

The bulk sales law, it was observed by Judge Mack, "defines one

among the several categories of fraudulent conveyances," conferring
12

Lindstrom v. Spicher, 53 N. Dak. 195, 205 N. W. 231 (1925).

See footnote 11.
Kasper v. Spokane Merchant's Assn., 87 Wash. Rep. 447, 151 P. 800 (1915).
15 Mutz v. Sanderson, 94 Neb. 293, 143 N. W. 302. (1913).
16 Conquest v. Atkins, 123 Me. 327, 122 AtI. 858. (1923).
17 Apple Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138 N. W. 1133 (1912).
18 Newman v. Garfield, 93 Vt. 16, 104 Atl. 881 (1918).
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"a substantive right in kind identical with the ancient right of a
creditor to attack a transfer made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors." ' The essential point of the statute is that a creditor
need not prove an intent to defraud. That "it does not differentiate
between sales that are honestly made and sales that are made with
intent to defraud" was emphatically pointed out in a New York case
2
in which a bulk sales law was held unconstitutional.
Though enacted primarily to protect the wholesaler,3 the bulk sales
acts, it is generally held, are intended to protect all creditors of the
seller. It sometimes becomes necessary, however, to determine who
are creditors, or to put it differently, what kind of claim makes one a
creditor within the meaning of the statute. As was remarked by
Mr. Justice Martin, "every chose in action is not necessarily a 'debt'
so as to give its owner a standing as a 'creditor' under the Sales in
Bulk Act." 4
In a case recently decided in Oregon, 5 a corporation operating a
chain of drug stores had sold its stock of goods early in 1931. It had
entered into a contract in 1929 whereby certain neon electric signs
were leased to it at a monthly rental of $17.50 each. This contract
was cancelled by the lessor because of the drug store company's default in payment of the monthly rental at a time when the sum of
$472 had accrued as such rental for the months of November and
December, 1930, and January, 1931. The lessor recovered a judgment against the drug store company in 1933 for $9,034.32 and then
invoking the provisions of the bulk sales law, brought a garnishment
proceeding against Witty, who had purchased the company's stock of
goods in 1931. The trial court gave the plaintiff judgment against the
garnishee for the accrued rental in the sum of $472, but not for the
amount of the damages. The plaintiff appealed.
"The crucial question," said the Supreme Court of Oregon, "is
whether a party holding an unliquidated claim is a 'creditor' within
the meaning of the Bulk Sales Law .

.

. The trial court held that

plaintiff was a creditor within the meaning of said law only
tent that plaintiff's claim against defendant was liquidated
transfer of said stock of goods was made by defendant to
nishee." The court concurred in the conclusion of the trial
affirmed the judgment.

to the exwhen the
said Garcourt and

1 Braun v. American Laundry Machinery Co., 56 F. (2d) 197, 198, 199 (1932).
2

Wright v. Hart, 182 N. Y. 330, 338, 75 N. E. 404 (1905); affirmed, 219 N. Y.

383, 114 N. E. 809 (1916).
3 Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, 183 P. 387, 5 A. L. R. 1512 (1919).

Silberstein & Sons, Inc. v. Cohen, 225 N. Y. 549 (1927).
Electrical Products Corp. of Oregon v. Ziegler Drug Stores, Inc., 157 Ore.
267, 71 P. (2d) 583 (197).
4
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An Indiana case, cited by the plaintiff, in which a landlord's claim
for rent accruing after the transfer was held to be within the bulk sales
law, was thus distinguished by the Oregon Court: "The obvious distinction is that in the Indiana case the lessor had not terminated and
cancelled the lease and prosecuted his claim for damages of its breach.
The terms of the lease rendered certain the amount of the landlord's
claim. In the case at bar, as to the portion of the claim in dispute,
the amount thereof did not become certain until final judgment had
been rendered.
In the Indiana case, 6 the plaintiff, Haley, leased to Trees for a
period of five years beginning March 1, 1929, a building which Trees
occupied as a hardware store. In April, 1931, Trees sold his stock of
goods to Wright and Todd. Haley asked for a judgment declaring
them receivers, as provided by the bulk sales law. The statute had
not been complied with, but there was no evidence that there were
other creditors and it was contended that Haley was not a creditor
when the sale was made, for the reason that the rent had been paid
to and including the last day of April. No rent was due or past due
on the date of the sale, and, it was argued, the obligation to pay rent
for the remainder of the term of the lease did not make Trees a debtor
or Haley his creditor.
Quoting from one of its earlier opinions, the court said: "The
statute refers in general terms to the creditors of the seller without any
exceptions or reservations. The statute does not except from its operation claims which are secured, nor does it except dispute claims which
are in litigation. The language being clear, the court has no power
to ingraft on the statute exceptions which the Legislature did not see
fit to make." 7
The court continued: "It is clear that Trees was, obligated under
the lease to pay appellee the rent for the building for the full term.
The premises had been delivered to and accepted by Trees who was in
possession. Appellee was not required to accept a surrender of the
premises, nor is it shown that they had been surrendered, or that he
did accept a surrender. Nor is there any effort to show, or rely upon,
any breach of the covenants of the lease by the appellee. The lessor's
obligation to pay the installments for the full term is no different than
the obligation to pay partial payments for merchandise delivered, and
accepted, and in possession. It is no different than the obligation to
pay for merchandise sold, to be paid for at a future date, which has
not arrived, or to pay a promissory note which was not matured and
which was given for merchandise.
6
7

Wright v. Haley, 208 Ind. 46, 194 N. E. 637 (1919).
George Kraft Co. v. Heller, 188 Ind. 612, 125 N. E. 209, 211 (1935).
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It is well settled that a creditor may maintain an action to set aside
a fraudulent conveyance, although his debt is not due...
No reason is suggested, or do we find a reason, why a creditor who
might maintain an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance might
not also maintain an action under the Bulk Sales Law."
A Rhode Island case involving a landlord's claim for rent did not
really require an interpretation of the statute.8 The tenant executed
a bill of sale February 1, 1932, the very day that the rent for February
was payable. So far as appears from the opinion, the claim was only
for the one month's rent. "To that extent," said the court, "the lessor
became a creditor of the lessee at the beginning of that day, even
though the lessee, under ordinary circumstances had that entire day
within which to pay."
A landlord's claim for damages, arising under the terms of the lease
after the tenant had made a sale in bulk, was held in a New York
case not to make the landlord a creditor at the time of the sale. Litkhad a store on Sixth avenue, which he rented from the plaintiff, and
had also a store on Grand street. On December third he sold his
Grand street business and stock of goods to a corporation which thereafter conducted business there. It was afterwards agreed that moneys
deposited for security should be applied to the December rent. By
the terms of the lease Litke was liable for any loss that the plaintiff
might incur by being obliged to relet the premises at a less rental
than that reserved in the lease. The plaintiff being unable to relet
premises in January, recovered a judgment for damages measured by
one month's rental and then brought an action to hold the corporation
accountable which had bought the Grand street store.
The court said: ". . . as we view this action the plaintiff has not
proven itself to be a creditor within the meaning of the Bulk Sales
Act. The transfer was made early in December. At that time Litke
was owing for the December rent. If this judgment had been upon
that liability the plaintiff would clearly come within the provisions of
the act. That liability, however, was satisfied by the application of
the deposit money, which Litke had made upon entering upon the
lease, and the present recovery upon which this action is based is for
damages for failing to rent the store in the month of January. At the
time of this transfer that was only a contingent liability under the
lease, and it was not such a liability as is protected by the Bulk Sales
Act . . . The Bulk Sales Act being in derogation of the common law
must be strictly construed. The transfers therein specified are made
void as against the creditors of the seller, unless such creditors of such
sale. The provisions of the statute, therefor, could hardly be applicable
8

Empire Radio Co., Inc. v. Bates, 56 R. I. 116, 183 A. 882 (1936).
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to parties who were not creditors at the time of the transfer, and who
might only become creditors upon the happening of some contingency." 9
A holder of a promissory note which is not yet due was held by
the same court not to be, within the meaning of the bulk sales act,
a creditor of an accommodation indorser, the liability of the indorser
being contingent on the dishonoring of the note and the giving of
notice of protest. 10
The obligee in an appeal bond was held in a Michigan case to be
a creditor of the surety, within the meaning of the bulk sales law, although the condition of the bond had not become absolute on an
affirmance on appeal." The effect of the decision should perhaps be
regarded as limited by the facts of the case, the court having held
that the evidence fully warranted the finding of the trial court that
the surety's sale of his stock of goods was made for the express purpose
of avoiding liability on the appeal bond. The bill of sale was made
within a few days after the surety signed the appeal bond and after
he had been advised by counsel to pay the judgment, and the bill of
sale was kept from record until after judgment had been entered upon
him on the bond. The court, however, spoke in broader terms than
the facts required: "It is urged by appellant (the purchaser under the
bill of sale, who replevined the goods from the sheriff after execution
had been levied on them) that George D. Hanna's liability upon the
bond could not be fixed until judgment upon appeal, and therefore
that the obligee in the bond was not, at the time of the sale, one of
his creditors. A creditor is "one who has a right to require of another
the fulfillment of a contract or obligation."

. .

. It cannot be said that

George Hanna's liability was not fixed at the moment he signed the
bond. It was fixed in amount, though contingent upon the failure
of his principal to prosecute his appeal, and reverse or pay the judgment . . . George D. Hanna was accepted as surety upon the appeal

bond solely on account of his ownership of the goods in question.
To permit him to dispose of his stock immediately thereafter, without notice to the obligee in the bond thus rendering the bond worthless, would result in encouraging the very fraud which the statute
was designed to prevent. The statute is remedial in character, and
should be given such a construction as will effect the plain legislative
intent."
In Griffin v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 12 the plaintiff had
purchased a tractor from the Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. in 1929,
9 Apex Leasing Co., Inc. v. Litke, 159 N. Y. Supp. 707 (1916); Affirmed 225
N. Y. 625, 121 N. E. 853 (1918).
10 Adam-Flanigan Co. v. DiDonato, 167 N. Y. Supp. 948 (1917); affirmed,
288 N. Y. 542, 126 N. E. 898 (1920).
11 Hanna v. Hurley, 162 Mich. 601, 127 N. W. 710 (1910).
12 65 N. D. 379, 259 N. W. 89 (1934).
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giving his note for the unpaid balance of the price. The tractor not
being as guaranteed, he rescinded the purchase, but thereafter made
three payments to the company in reliance on its successive promises
to put the tractor in first class order or return all that he had paid.
The company failed to make good its promises and he demanded the
return of all his payments. He brought an action in November, 1932,
and recovered a judgment in February, 1934. Meanwhile, on June 1,
1931 - it does not appear from the opinion whether this was before
or after the plaintiff made his final rescission, - the company had
sold its entire stock of goods to another corporation, and the plaintiff,
having recovered his judgment against the thresher company, had not
brought an action against that corporation. The court held that he
was not a creditor at the time of the transfer and therefore had not
cause of action against the corporation to which the transfer was made.
Referring to the definition of the term "creditor" contained in another .statutory provision the court said: "Our statute, section 7216
of the Compiled Laws, defines the term "Creditor" thus: 'A Creditor
within the meaning of this chapter is one in whose favor an obligation
exists by reason of which he is or may become entitled to the payment
of money.'
A disputed claim, on which a judgment was subsequently recovered,
was held ii Indiana to be within the bulk sales law.13 The nature of
the claim is not stated in the opinion, but from a later opinion, delivered on an affirmance of the judgment on the claim, it appears that
the defendant, the lessee of the first floor of a building, made changes
in a partition or party wall, with the result that the wall gave way
and damage was caused to the goods of the upper floor. 14 After recovering his judgment, and while an appeal was pending the plaintiff
brought an action in which he asked that a corporation, which had
purchased the stock of goods of the defendant in the earlier section, be
declared a receiver.
In Harrisonv. Riddell,' 5 an unliquidated tort claim was held not to
be within the bulk sales law. The effect of the decision is, however,
limited by the fact that the statute was, in the court's words, "intended
to the business." Generally the
only to protect creditors incident
6
statutes are not thus limited.'
The claim was for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff, when
he was struck by an automobile. The owner of the car, shortly after
the accident, made a long-contemplated transfer of his business to a
corporation. The plaintiff made no demand until more than eight
-3 George Kraft Co. v. Heller, Supra.
14 Independent Five & Ten Cent Stores of New York v. Heller, 189 Ind.
554, 127 N. E. 439 (1920).
15 64 Mont. 466, 210 P. 460 (1920).
16 Annotation 84 A. L. R. 1406.
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months later, when he brought an action in which he later recovered
a judgment. He relied on an earlier Montana decision in which it
was held that one personally injured by the tort of another becomes
a creditor of the latter the day on which the former's cause of action
arises.
In a Georgia case, where the plaintiff in a death action levied an
attachment on property which the defendant had sold some eight months
after the cause of action arose, it was held that the sale was not void
under the bulk sales act as to the plaintiff; the decision was
not, how17
ever, on the ground that the cause of action was in tort.
Where a transfer is attacked, not under the bulk sales laws, but on
the ground that it is fraudulent, it is generally held that tort claimants
are within the protection afforded by the statutes and the doctrines
established by the courts.18
An attorney's claim for services rendered in connection with the
sale has been held not to be within the bulk sales act.'
Richard G. Miller.

WHAT IS DEFAMATION OF A GROUP OR CLAss?-Defamation is a
false publication by which it is intended to bring one to disrepute; if it
is communicated through the sense of hearing it is called slander; and
if it is communicated through the sense of sight it is libel.' In order
that such defamation be actionable, it must have been communicated
to a -third person. This is known as a "publication." 2

In Kenny v. Illinois State Journal Company,3 libel is defined as,
"Everything printed which reflects on character of another by imputing moral turpitude, fraud, dishonesty or dishonorable conduct, or
which tends to bring such other into public contempt, hatred, scorn or
ridicule." Justice Edwards, in Wright v. Woolworth Company,4 explains that under common law, which is still in force in Illinois even
though modified by statutes, there are five classes of spoken words
which "give rise to a cause of action for their false utterance concerning a person, in the presence and hearing of others. They are: first,
words imputing to the party the commission of a criminal offense;
17
18

Foremost Daries Ind. v. Kelly, 51 Ga. App. 722, 181 S. E. 204 (1935).
Annotation 39 A. L. R. 175.

19

Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tonas, 133 Md. 270, 105 A. 174 (1918).

1
2

Chapin on Torts, Hornbook series, p. 293.
Chapin on Torts, Hornbook series, p. 296.
3 Kenny v. Illinois State Journal Co., 64 Ill.
App. 39 (1895).
4 Wright v. Woolworth Co., 281 Ill.
App. 495 (1935).
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second, words which impute that the party is infected with some contageous disease, where, if the accusation be true, it-would exlude the
party from society; third, defamatory words which impute to the
party unfitness to perform the duties of an office or employment of
profit, or the want of integrity in the discharge of the duties of such
office or employment; fourth, defamatory words which prejudice such
party in his or her profession or trade; and fifth, defamatory words
which, though not in themselves actionable, occasion the party special
damage."
"Class" refers to a large number of persons that can be collectively
designated under one name; while "group" is used to designate a particular or limited collection of persons of a general class, usually a
small group of persons. 5
It is generally held that defamation of a class of persons wherein
no individual of that class is affected, such member of the class of
persons cannot maintain an action to recover damages for an alleged

libel or slander. 6 In RULING CAsE LAW, it is generally expressed that,

"where the class or group in question is a very large one and there is
little or nothing said or written which applies to the particular person
who brings his action, the right of recovery will be denied." 7
In the case of Louisville Times v. Stivers s it is pointed out that in
order to hold an action, the plaintiff must show that the defaming publication did him harm. The article in question referred to a feud between two families within Kentucky from which plaintiff said it could
be imputed that "The crime of engaging in vindictive strife and guerilla
warfare for the last fifty years, no part of which is true, but is wholly
false." The court further showed that in order to defame a group such
article must apply to every member, and that as the size of the group
becomes greater, it will become all the more difficult for the plaintiff
to show that such article applied to him, since such article cannot be
directed toward the one. The supreme court of Kentucky said the
plaintiff's case cannot hold since no names were mentioned in the publication, it refering to family name in question which did not tend to
defame the plaintiff. That the fact that a person's name is Stivers
does not prove that he was defamed because of a publication which
relates to the "Stivers Clan."
But in similar cases, where only a relatively small group of persons, belonging to a particular or limited collection of persons, to
whom can be imputed a defamation aimed against all members of that
5
6
7
8

Annotation, 97 A. L. R. 281.
Annotation, 97 A. L. R. 281.
17 Ruling Case Law 375.
Louisville Times v. Stivers, 252 Ky. 843, 68 S. W. (2d) 411 (1934).
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group, or family, any member of that group may bring suit. 9 RULING
CASE LAW points this out to be an exception: "if the language employed is directed toward a comparatively small group of persons, or
a general class, and is so framed as to make defamatory imputations
against all members of the small or restricted group it seems that any
member thereof may sue." 10
In an early Illinois case, 11 the court held that the plaintiff bringing action need not be mentioned by name in the defamatory matter,
so long as the words can be shown to be describing the person and so
understood by others.
Consequently it may be concluded that if defamatory language is
used, either libelously or slanderously, against a whole group (a small
number of persons), which includes everyone of that group, such a defamation refers to each party of the group, and each member of that
group may bring suit; 12 but, if the defamation is broad, involving a general class of persons (a large number of persons), and such defamation
cannot be imputed to any particular member of the general class of members, then no particular member of such class has a right of action to re13
cover for damages arising out of such publication.
Thomas S. Gordon, Jr.
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Constitution Publishing Co. v. Leathers, 48 Ga. App. 429, 172 S. E. 923

(1934).
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17 Ruling Case Law 376.
Mothersill v. Voliva, 158 II. App. 16 (1910).
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